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APPELLEE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The University Hospital, pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, hereby petitions this Court for a rehearing, 
based on the following reasons and grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
The plurality opinion of this Court is both complex and 
diverse. The four separate opinions written by members of the 
Court reveal that little was agreed upon by the members of this 
Court. After a careful analysis of the separate opinions 
appellees believe it fair to state that the following decisions 
were made: 
1. The $100,000 statutory cap provision of the prior 
governmental immunity statutes (S§ 62-30-29 & 34) was held 
unconstitutional as it applies specifically to the 
University Hospital. 
2. Section 63-30-4, which provides that employees of 
governmental entities may not be held personally liable for 
acts or omissions within the course and scope of their 
employment, unless due to fraud or malice, is not 
unconstitutional as applied to employees of the University 
of Utah School of Medicine or the University Hospital. 
3. Two members of the Court believe that a substantive 
due process analysis should be made regarding statutes 
limiting recovery rights, one member believes that an 
intermediate equal protection standard should be applied, 
and two members believe a rational basis equal protection 
standard should be applied. 
Assuming that appellees1 interpretation of the opinion is 
correct, it can be stated that this opinion per se does not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
affect the present statutory scheme in which a $250,000 maximum 
has been imposed nor does it affect governmental entities other 
than the University Hospital, either health care providers or 
non-health care providers. As a practical matter, however, this 
decision will have a substantial impact upon future application 
by the trial courts of the Governmental Immunity Act and its 
present damage cap, applicable to all governmental entities and 
particularly the University of Utah School of Medicine and the 
University Hospital. 
Because of these important ramifications this decision must 
be viewed as more than merely a resolution of a conflict between 
the plaintiffs and defendants in the instant case. It 
establishes important principles and procedures which no doubt 
will be applied in many cases involving numerous other plaintiffs 
and defendants in a host of governmental liability disputes. 
POINT I 
A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED TO ALLOW 
APPELLEES THE OPPORTUNITY OF ADDRESSING THE 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS STANDARD ADOPTED BY 
TWO MEMBERS OF THIS COURT. 
A review of the lower court proceedings on Appellants1 
motion for partial summary judgment reveals that the question of 
substantive due process was never argued by either party or 
decided by the lower court. Similarly, the briefs to this Court 
did not address this standard. Indeed, the Berry decision, upon 
which this standard is purportedly based was not decided until 
2 
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after appellees1 brief was filed. No request was made by this 
Court to file supplemental briefs during the three-year period 
this case was being decided. 
Likewise, the open court provision was not relied upon by 
appellants in the proceedings below nor on this appeal. While it 
was urged that this constitutional provision was a right 
deserving the highest equal protection standard it was never 
claimed or argued that this provision should be a basis of 
invalidating the recovery limit statutes. 
All Justices acknowledge that due process was not argued 
below or before this Court. Justices Durham and Zimmerman excuse 
this irregularity by claiming that equal protection and 
substantive due process are nearly the identical standards. See, 
e.g., Slip Opinion, pp. 15 (J. Durham); pp. 35 (J. Zimmerman 
concurring). On the other hand Justice Stewart argues that these 
standards are different and are designed for separate analyses. 
Slip Opinion, p. 39 (J. Stewart concurring). Finally, Justices 
Hall and Howe argue that the standards are separate and 
traditional concepts of judicial review have been violated by 
considering these issues on appeal. Slip Opinion, pp. 53-54, (J. 
Hall and J. Howe, dissenting). 
Appellees believe there are fundamental reasons why a due 
process analysis cannot be applied in this case. However, it 
would be a waste of resources for appellees to brief this issue 
3 
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unless the Court will allow the input of the parties. Appellee 
contends that this Court's failure to follow appropriate judicial 
review procedures, by deciding this case based on a 
constitutional provision and standards not relied upon by 
appellants, and therefore not briefed or argued by appellees, 
violates its rights to due process of law under the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. This Court has decided an extremely 
important issue based upon a state constitutional provision 
(Article I, Sec. 11), and an analytical standard (due process as 
opposed to equal protection) which were not briefed or argued by 
the parties. Appellees had no reason or right to brief or argue 
those issues because they were not raised by appellants. 
Appellees have been deprived of the right to be heard on critical 
issues upon which this Court1s ruling is based. 
This serious error should be corrected by allowing briefs 
and argument on these issues. Cf. Yotvat v. Roth, 290 N.W.2d 
524, 532 (Wis. ct. App. 1980). It is, therefore, respectfully 
requested by the University Hospital that a rehearing be granted 
on this most important question of limitation on state government 
liability. 
POINT II 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD AMEND 
ITS OPINION AND REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING AND DETERMINATION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
BASED ON THE NEWLY FORMULATED STANDARD. 
If this Court declines to allow appellees the opportunity to 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
argue the legal standards that should be applied, it should, at a 
minimum, allow appellees the opportunity of having an evidentiary 
hearing in the lower court. A remand is essential because of the 
following: 
1. This case originated as an interlocutory appeal 
from the denial of a motion for partial summary judgment, 
where no attempt was made to adduce substantive evidence. 
2. The new standard formulated by a plurality of this 
Court has shifted the burden of proof thereby mandating a 
new hearing in which the burden can be correctly applied. 
In the proceedings below a motion for partial summary 
judgment was made by the plaintiffs. No attempt was made by 
either party to extensively examine the factual basis upon which 
the $100,000 cap was legislated. In fact, the major controversy 
below and in this Court was the standard which should be used in 
judging the constitutionality of the statutes. No effort was 
made by either party to develop empirical evidence of any 
magnitude concerning the validity of the statute because the 
magnitude of the evidence required was directly dependent upon 
the standard adopted. 
The lower court, following then existing law, apparently 
applied the rational basis standard. In fact, this Court prior 
to Berry had never applied even a "heightened" standard under 
equal protection analysis, but had relied exclusively on a 
rational basis standard in cases not involving suspect 
classifications or fundamental rights. As such, the burden of 
5 
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proof was upon the plaintiffs :i n the 1 ower court to show the 
statute f In iiiiironst il nf lonal As i 1 :)ted, b\ me author n t y 
The burden of proving a constitutional violation must 
be sustained as a demonstrable reality and not as a matter 
of speculation, and is not sustained by generalities. 
Accordingly, the party having the burden of proving 
invalidity must do so clearly or beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Moreover, he must negative every conceivable or reasonable 
basis which might support the statute, or prove the absence 
of any conceivable grounds on which the statute may be 
supported. 
* * * 
The party attacking the statute has the burden of 
establishing the invalidating facts on which his claim is 
based, of showing that the legislative findings of fact are 
without rational basis, or that the stated facts on the 
existence of which a statute is predicated does not exist. 
16 C.J.S. §104, Constitutional Law, pp. 344-48 (footnotes to 
citations omitted). 
Thus v.-s approach and as noted by Justice Hall in 
the dissenting opinion the burden of overcoming the presumption 
nt ronstituf innaJjfy WHIS irh-wii I y I-HUHM-MI npun I! hi appp I 1 aim I »i who 
must "prove abuse of legislative discretion beyond a reasonable 
doubt.! f 11 • • Opinion, p 5 2) 
In spite i the clear burden placed upon the plaintiffs in 
the lower court, the various opinions written in this case 
repeatedly state that the appellees ti -i n. I ail - ,3 t i nupei their 
burden of proof in th*- lower court and before this Court, A few 
examples of thili s required burden are as follows: 
By means of (1) extending immunity to employees of all 
government-owned health care facilities and (2) imposing a 
blanket cap on all recoveries, the legislature has sought to 
respond to what the University Hospital and the Attorney 
General in his amicus brief describes as a "financial 
crisis" in state liability and liability insurance. No 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
factual information regarding the alleged crisis has been 
cited to this Court, either from the legislative history of 
the Act, the evidentiary record in the court below, or 
reliable sources of which this Court could legitimately take 
judicial notice. Indeed, most of the Attorney General's 
sources are newspaper articles from other states, and the 
majority of them deal with municipal, rather than state, 
liability problems. The state asks this Court to engage in 
the kind of speculation about legislative rational 
associated with the "any conceivable rational basis test." 
However, because of the constitutional status of the right 
to a remedy for damages to one's person under Article I, 
§11, more is required. (Slip Opinion, pp. 18-19, Justice 
Durham opinion). (Emphasis added). 
The recovery limitation in the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act on all damages caused by government-owned 
health care providers and their employees is such an 
unreasonable burden. There is no factual showing in the 
legislative history or the trial court that the recovery 
limitation is reasonably necessary for preservation of the 
public treasury. It is true, of course, there will be less 
cost to the state and insurance will be more readily 
obtainable if the state does not have to respond in damages 
in excess of $100,000 for injuries caused by its health care 
entities and employees or insure against those damages. 
However, before the state is permitted to conserve those 
monies at the expense of seriously injured citizens, its 
citizens are entitled to a showing in the courts that a 
measure so drastic and arbitrary as a $100,000 cap on all 
damages is urgently and overwhelmingly necessary. (Slip 
Opinion, p. 28, Justice Durham opinion). (Emphasis added). 
* * * 
[T]he burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of 
the statute shifts to its proponents. The supporters of the 
legislation have not carried their burden. The 
justifications advanced for the legislatures having abridged 
the important right of citizens to recover even out-of-
pocket losses occasioned by injuries to their persons is a 
narrow category of circumstances for the benefit of a narrow 
category of defendants are extraordinarily weak. In fact, 
at oral argument both the Attorney General and the lawyer 
for the hospital and physicians involved admitted that they 
had no empirical evidence that damage awards in Utah have 
threatened the stability of any unit of government and that 
the concerns that led to the legislation were based on 
7 
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anecdotal evidence. (slip Opinion, pp. 37038, Justice 
Zimmerman opinion) (Emphasis added). 
[TJhere is no basis for concluding that according 
patients at the University Hospital a full remedy for tort 
liability will threat the financial stability of government 
or of the hospital, or even result in an undue drain on 
resources. While there will be some additional expenditures 
incurred by the hospital's liability for full damages, there 
is no reason to believe that that cost cannot be recovered 
as present liabilities. . . . Neither the hospital nor the 
Attorney General in this case even begins to demonstrate 
that requiring the hospital to shoulder the full cost of 
liability will have a substantial effect on the state's 
treasury. There is no evidence that in Utah personal 
judgments are unduly large or that they have increased 
greatly in their number. Indeed, since the government bears 
only a fraction of the total cost of the operation of the 
entity, it is clear that the vast bulk of the activity ;: 
self-financed by fees and charges. (Slip Opinion, ^ 4 
Justice Stewart opinion). (Emphasis added). 
The sep'di'
 t\ te op ,1 in J ons ot 1 he cour t haspci upon substantive 
due process and an intermediate standard - r equal protection have 
elevated the standard of review 
*-- * constitutionality and shifted t .1 :ie burden c >f proof 
trie state ~ p:\-vt - ;.•• validity of the statute. 
r\ i e v x e • si' a i"» i'" e s 11! 1:1 i i s i • d s i" b I! \ i n w >, t lie 
.lowing: The lowe: ^ u ; adopted the rational basis test as 
the correct standard thereby placing the burden upon the 
plaintiffs tn ^ iinu that th<: ley i * i .-H ion ,i > q u e s t i o n could « o * b e 
supported under that standard. The defendants made no effort to 
create a record proving the legislative reasons n«M If, l« at K M " 
t '"''r t tie ,-it at: \i 11:' beiLrtusi;' 11 wat not required oi :i appeal, however, 
8 
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this Court adopted a new standard which was not argued below. In 
deciding that the recovery limitations statutes are 
unconstitutional three Justices of this Court based their 
decision on the failure of the State to produce any evidence 
showing the reasonableness or necessity of the recovery 
limitation statutes. Because the state made no effort during the 
lower court proceedings and minimal effort on appeal to produce 
evidence justifying the statutes, there is naturally not a record 
in this case which could satisfy the new heightened standard now 
applied by this Court. 
In effect, therefore, appellees have been denied due process 
of law. They have not been given the opportunity to produce 
evidence supporting the validity of these statutes and have been 
found to be deficient in their quantum of proof even though the 
lower court proceedings did not require such proof to be 
introduced. Not only did the University Hospital not have the 
opportunity to argue the formulation of this new standard but it 
does not, unless this decision is remanded, have the opportunity 
to present evidence in accordance with new standard. 
It is not only fundamentally unfair to the University 
Hospital in this case to be denied an opportunity to meet the 
standard now created by a plurality of this Court but is also 
against all judicial rules of appellate procedure to prohibit a 
party from presenting evidence in accordance with the new 
9 
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standarc - -- • example <• mi I upon 
^ . . , : , • * • * -,*- *~,r substantial 
reasons justifying the $100, !r substantive 
due process standard dim - * ^ 
st and a rd . •. • • .  . • . 
The Idaho Supreme r* Jones . __: - Board of .Medicine, 
555 P.2d 39? •< .is. • a factual 
determination of whethe: n medical malpractice crisis actually 
existed justifying a imitation upon medica -• •* :• • This samiH 
prni-edurt' s J m i u ,1 r j ILK I  J *;• #- H m I he instant case t- a.low the 
appellees the opportunity <,-r meeting their newly acquired burden 
of proof - x Ln±s uyr. * " - -s.] l vi c ] ate the 
veiy MI gli fnurt- professe> * ptui-^r ; v.* opinion. 
POINT 
BECAUSE
 A P P E L L E E S JUSTIFIABLY RELIED UPON THE 
RECOVERY LIMITATION STATUTES, THIS DECISION 
SHOULD BE APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY ONLY 
The recovery limitation provision w<is t 
Legislature I |4n'i emained unchallenged until -^e 
instant case more than twenty years later. This Court in i960 
specifically held that the University Host •- a pei for med a 
governmental I urn lion lot purposes of determining applicability ' 
of the Governmental Immunity Act Frank v. State, 613 p.: d si 7 
(Utah 1980). 
10 
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I 
In fact, in reliance on the recovery limitations statutes, 
the Hospital set its fees charged to patients, established its 
reserves for liability claims, funded its malpractice defense 
trust, and decided not to purchase insurance. In essence the 
Hospital's entire risk management system has been established in 
reliance on the recovery limitation statutes and prior opinions 
of this Court. It is impossible to "pass on" this increased 
liability exposure of pending cases to patients who have long 
since departed from the University Hospital. It is also 
impossible to purchase insurance for pending claims. 
"Constitutional law neither requires nor prohibits 
retroactive operation of an overruling decision." Loyal Order of 
Moose No. 259 v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257,. 264 (Utah 1982). A 
court in its discretion may prohibit retroactive operation of an 
overruling decision where retroactive operation creates a burden 
or where the overruled law has been justifiably relied upon. 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance, 493 P.2d 
1002 (Utah 1972). 
This Court in Loyal Order of Moose No. 259, supra, refused 
to apply a decision striking down a rule regarding an 
organization's exemption for tax purposes because of its 
charitable activities. This Court said: 
We believe the circumstances of this case require that 
the rules adopted in this decision be applied prospectively 
with a delayed effective date. The holding in the 1975 
B.O.P.E. case has been the law upon which many organizations 
have operated and upon which tax exemptions have been 
11 
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granted or denied. Further, the step in the direction of 
that case was first taken in the Groesbeck case in 1911. 
Without warning it would be inequitable to correct an 
interpretation of law that has been relied upon for so many 
years. Also, if the rule were to be given retroactive 
effect, the assessment of back taxes on properties affected 
by this rule might well result in an unreasonable burden 
upon all those organizations and governmental bodies 
associated with it. By staying the effective date of our 
ruling in this case, not only are court and agency resources 
saved, but time also is allowed for organizations affected 
to make needed adjustments. 657 P.2d at 265. 
See also Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. 
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 
1984); Rio Algo Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1984) . 
Similarly, in Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 
P.2d 265 (Utah 1985), this Court held: 
The circumstances of this decision are very similar to 
those in Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d 257, which gave rise 
to that case's holding respecting its effective date. The 
defendants here have relied for many years on a statutory 
interpretation of a constitutional provision, and this 
opinion resolves a difficult question of first impression. 
Because of the substantial delay entailed in the litigation 
process, retroactive application requiring the assessment of 
back taxes might well result in an unreasonable burden on 
the defendants in this case and on other similarly situated 
entities. Substantial changes in their operating budgets, 
record-keeping, and admission policies may result from our 
holding. It may be that adjustments in accounting practices 
and other policies will enable these defendants and other 
hospitals to qualify in the future for the constitutional 
exemption. In order to avoid the unreasonable burden that 
might otherwise be placed on them, we hold that the ruling 
of this case shall be applied prospectively only with an 
effective date of January 1, 1986. 
Id. at 279. 
12 
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« 
These principles are equally applicable in the present case. ( 
It would be inequitable and would place an unreasonable burden on 
the University Hospital to suddenly remove the limitation cap as 
to those cases arising during the time period it was in effect. < 
Thus, the decision rendered by this Court should be applied 
prospectively only. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of May, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
B y T w ^ r - UJ<J4*^__ 
MeTIin R.'Lybbert 
David G. Williams 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the foregoing 
Appellee University Hospital's Petition for Rehearing upon the 
following counsel of record: 
M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
175 East 400 South, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this 30th day of May, 1989, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
to said counsel. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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